THE TENSION BETWEEN THE AUTONOMY OF REASON AND NATURE IN HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Demir V. M.

Problemata: International Journal of Philosophy, cilt.11, sa.4, ss.59-80, 2020 (Hakemli Dergi)

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 11 Sayı: 4
  • Basım Tarihi: 2020
  • Dergi Adı: Problemata: International Journal of Philosophy
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Other Indexes
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.59-80
  • Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

Makale Hegel'in felsefesinde doğa bilimleri ile akıl arasındaki gerilimi ele alıyor. Doğanın güçsüzlüğü tezini merkeze alarak kavram ve doğa ilişkisini inceliyor.

This article discusses the relationship between the externality of nature and the autonomy of reason, one of the most vexing problems in Hegel’s philosophy. Simply, it focuses on the question of how the compatibility of the logical structure of reason and factual reality is solved in Hegelian system. It is asserted here that Hegel finds the answers given before him in modern philosophy of nature inadequate, so he refuses both realist and idealist approaches. For him, nature is neither wholly compatible nor distinct from reason. Since he repudiates the two options, asking whether Hegel’s philosophy of nature is a priori style or not becomes irrelevant. After reviewing the literature, a new interpretation beyond this dichotomy is suggested. On the basis of an analysis of the first pages of Philosophy of Nature I will show that, according to Hegel, nature and metaphysics are two different language games: the essential issue is a problem of translation. Although Idea serves as a metalanguage holding together these two language games, no exact

transition is possible.