Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
İçtimaiyat (Online), cilt.9, sa.2, ss.1050-1063, 2025 (TRDizin)
This article argues that at the core of the sustainable development concept lies a philosophical problem: the idea of moral responsibility toward future generations. The sustainability ideal, introduced globally through the Brundtland Report (1987), challenges traditional ethical theories with its claim to protect the rights of not-yet-existent generations. The paper highlights how the "future generations’ problem" has gained urgency in the Anthropocene era due to the destructive effects of technology (nuclear waste, climate crisis, microplastics), while discussing the need for new ethical models. Thinkers who reject responsibility toward future generations focus on their "non-existence," the ambiguity of their rights, our inability to know their needs, and the practical difficulties of economic sacrifices. In contrast, arguments justifying responsibility for future generations assert that existence is not a prerequisite for responsibility, that threshold needs (e.g., clean water, habitable climate) are self-evident, and that the concept of harm must be reconsidered. By analyzing the tension between utilitarianism and rights-based ethics, the article emphasizes that the universal needs of future generations are predictable, making ethical responsibility inevitable. In conclusion, the article posits that sustainability not only involves political-economic dimensions but also expands philosophical discourse by introducing a temporal dimension to ethical responsibility.