Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Problema, sa.20, 2026 (Scopus)
An important set of critiques regarding exclusionary reasons targets the scope of exclusion. According to these critiques, it is always or sometimes impossible to determine the scope of exclusion without recourse to the balance of the first-order reasons. Thus, exclusionary reasons cannot fulfil the function assigned to them. The paper first attempts to fill in the gaps in Raz’s account of exclusionary reasons. It converts the conditions for legitimate authority, such as the expertise, the dependence, and the efficacy conditions for political/legal authorities, into scope restriction criteria. It does so by making use of the “clear mistakes” doctrine. Then, based on the foregoing, it demonstrates that the critics are mistaken in their claims that the determination of the scope of exclusionary reasons always or sometimes depends on the weights or the balance of first-order reasons.