Ibn Rushd's Critics of al-Farabi's Analysis About 'Universal and Personal Accident' in Talkhis al-Maqulat or on the Ontological and Epistemic Substance

Birgül M.

BEYTULHIKME-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, vol.9, no.3, pp.843-880, 2019 (ESCI) identifier


In Aristotle's famous work titled Categories, there is an important and critical chapter (1a20-1b25), not only in terms of logic but also in metaphysics. This section, in which the existing ones classified into a quaternary classification, a basic perspective on the nature of ore and symptoms and what is total and less is presented. The most critical point of this classification which Aristotle made on 'being on a subject' and being told 'about a subject', is the determination of which kinds of predicates are obliged to convey to his subject matter and meaning. In this regard, because of the shortness of Aristotle's text and the limited examples are given, different interpretations have emerged since ancient times. Ibn Rushd criticizes the different interpretations of the nature of the information they give about the ores they are loaded, which are very important especially in terms of 'definition theory'. Ibn Rushd, who found that the solution of Farabi on this matter, rightly left the general interpretation of the ancient Sharia, especially criticized the solution of Farabi by considering the interpretation of Ibn Sina and reached the most healthy solution in his way.